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1.   Introduction 
The Stability and Growth Pact provides a mutually agreed code 
of conduct on how fiscal policy should be framed and 
practiced in member states from the onset of Stage III of EMU.   
National fiscal authorities must ensure that fiscal performance 
meets the requirements of the Pact.   There are other 
organisations, such as the European Commission and the 
ESCB, whose task it is to assess member states’ compliance 
with the Pact.   It is important, therefore, that the Pact’s specific 
provisions are examined in some detail in order to ascertain 
what the Pact requires of member states. 
 
It is particularly important that the so-called “close to balance or 
in surplus” provision of the Pact (hereafter, for simplicity, 
referred to as the close to balance provision) is analysed and 
understood.   In, perhaps, its most commonly quoted form, this 
provision stipulates that “adherence to the medium-term 
objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus 
will allow member states to deal with normal cyclical 
fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the 3 
per cent of GDP reference value.”
1   The importance of the 
provision is stressed in the recital: “firm political guidelines are 
issued in order to implement the Stability and Growth Pact in a 
strict and timely manner and in particular to adhere to the 
medium term objective of budgetary positions of close to 
balance or in surplus.” 
                                                 
1   from the recital to Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997. 
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In spite of its prominence and critical role in the Pact, there is a 
vagueness surrounding the close to balance provision.   There is 
no clearcut definition in the Pact of either of the key terms 
“medium-term” and “close to balance or in surplus”.   The 
purpose of this paper is to interpret the close to balance 
provision and discern what it requires of member states in the 
setting of medium-term budgetary targets. 
 
In section 2, the background to the adoption of the Pact and the 
close to balance provision is discussed.   The Pact comprises a 
Resolution of the European Council of 16/17 June 1997 and two 
Council Regulations of 7 July 1997 (published on 2 August 
1997).   These provide a natural starting point for examining the 
detail and implications of the close to balance provision.   The 
two Regulations and the Resolution, along with an agreed code 
of conduct on the content and format of stability and 
convergence programmes (Opinion of the Monetary Committee 
(16 September 1998) which was endorsed by the Council (12 
October 1998)), are examined in section 3.   
 
The key terms of “close to balance or in surplus” and “medium 
term” are each examined in turn in section 4.   It is suggested 
that two safety margins – a minimum safety margin and a safety 
margin for long-term factors (of which the former is the more 
fundamental requirement)  - should be calculated in assessing 
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus.   Section 5 
concludes.   4
 
2.   The Background to the Close to Balance Provision 
(i)  Fiscal Policy in Monetary Union 
When assessing the role of fiscal policy in monetary union, a 
certain tension exists between maintaining fiscal discipline and 
allowing member states a degree of fiscal flexibility (see Buti et 
al).
 2   The need to maintain fiscal discipline to complement the 
operation of monetary policy in EMU has long been stressed 
within the EU.   In EMU, monetary policy is formulated at the 
euro-area level and its prime objective is to maintain price 
stability within the euro-area as a whole.   Fiscal policy, 
however, continues to remain within the remit of national 
governments.   An associated danger is that, in the absence of 
some external or commonly-agreed constraint, national 
authorities may pursue loose fiscal policies that taken together 
may threaten the monetary policy aim of maintaining price 
stability within the euro-area.   For this reason, imposing 
discipline on the exercising of national fiscal policies within 
monetary union has generally been considered desirable. 
 
At the same time, it has also been recognised that a degree of 
flexibility in fiscal management needs to be afforded to member 
states.   With monetary policy being set at the euro-area level 
and being geared towards euro-area policy objectives, fiscal 
policy remains the sole macroeconomic policy instrument 
                                                 
2  Buti M., D. Franco and H. Ongena (1998), “Fiscal Discipline and Flexibility in EMU:  The 
Implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 14, 
3, pp. 81-97. 
   5
available for management of domestic economic conditions.   
Given that the common monetary policy stance might not be 
ideal at times for individual member states, fiscal policy could 
compensate for this by b eing utilised by member states in a 
manner which helped stabilise domestic aggregate demand 
growth. 
 
While recognising this tension between discipline and flexibility, 
it has generally been considered to be of paramount importance 
that fiscal policy does not jeopardise the credibility of monetary 
policy in EMU.   Consequently, when drawing up the fiscal 
rules to which EU member states must adhere, it was 
considered necessary to impose some form of constraint on 
national fiscal policies within monetary union.   The Stability and 
Growth Pact was adopted by the European Council in 1997 
with the purpose of ensuring fiscal discipline in monetary union.   
It followed the initial fiscal rules laid down in the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992 and a proposal for a “Stability Pact for Europe” 
put forward by the German finance minister, Theo Waigel, in 
November 1995.    
 
(ii)  The Maastricht Treaty 
The need for fiscal discipline in EU member states prior to and 
within monetary union was first encapsulated in the Maastricht 
Treaty (1992).   Article 104c of the Treaty states that “Member 
States shall avoid excessive government deficits”.   Budgetary 
discipline is examined on the basis of:   6
(a)  whether the government deficit exceeds a reference value 
(specified, in the Protocol on the excessive deficit procedure 
annexed to the Treaty, as being equal to 3 per cent for the ratio 
of the planned or actual government deficit to gross domestic 
product at market prices), unless either the ratio has declined 
substantially and continuously  and reached a level that comes 
close to the reference value or, alternatively, the excess over the 
reference value is only exceptional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value;    
and  
(b)  whether the ratio of government debt to gross domestic 
product exceeds a reference value (specified in the Protocol as 
being equal to 60 per cent), unless the ratio is sufficiently 
diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace. 
 
The Treaty empowers the Commission to prepare a report if a 
member state does not fulfil the requirements under one or both 
of these criteria.   It may also prepare a report if it is of the 
opinion that there is a risk of an excessive deficit in a member 
state.   If it considers that an excessive deficit in a member state 
exists or may occur, the Commission addresses an opinion to 
the Council.   In turn, the Council decides, after an overall 
assessment, whether an excessive deficit exists.   If an excessive 
deficit is decided to exist, the Council will make 
recommendations to the member state concerned with a view to 
bringing that situation to an end within a given period.   The 
member state then must put into practice the recommendations 
of the Council.   If the member state fails to implement these 
recommendations, the Council may decide to apply one or 
more of a number of measures.   Among the measures available 
are requiring the member state to make a non-interest-bearing 
deposit “of an appropriate size” with the Community until the   7
excessive deficit has, in the view of the Council, been corrected 
and imposing fines “of an appropriate size”. 
 
(iii)  The Waigel Proposal          
In November 1995, the German finance minister, Theo Waigel, 
proposed a “Stability Pact for Europe” to strengthen and to 
complement the Treaty’s fiscal performance criteria.   The 
salient features of the Waigel proposal were: 
- setting a medium-term deficit goal of 1 per cent of GDP in 
‘normal’ economic conditions; 
 
- allowing exceptions to the observance of the 3 per cent deficit 
limit only in exceptional circumstances such as an annual fall in 
real GDP of at least 2 per cent or a decrease in GDP for four 
quarters in a row; 
 
- reducing progressively debt levels below the 60 per cent of 
GDP level indicated in the Treaty. 
 
The Waigel proposal also sought to strengthen the excessive 
deficit procedure by putting certain arrangements on an 
automatic footing.   A member state would be automatically in 
breach of its obligations if the government deficit exceeded 3 
per cent of GDP, except in the exceptional circumstances 
outlined above.   The pecuniary sanctions for a breach of the 3 
per cent threshold would also be put on an automatic footing 
with non-interest-bearing deposits of 0.25 per cent being 
required for each point or fraction of a point by which the 
deficit exceeded the 3 per cent of GDP level.   The deposit 
would be transformed into a fine if the excessive deficit 
remained two years later.   8
 
(iv)  The Stability and Growth Pact 
A number of the provisions of the Waigel proposal were not 
included in the Stability and Growth Pact adopted in 1997.   
The constraint on the government debt was discarded, the 
uniform medium-target for the deficit of 1 per cent was deemed 
not to take sufficient account of country-specific requirements 
and was considered neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee 
respect of the 3 per cent of GDP ceiling, the “exceptionality” 
clause was considered too restrictive, and the automaticity of 
sanctions was deemed to go beyond the provisions of the 
Treaty, which left a degree of discretion to the European 
Commission and the Ecofin Council in this respect.
3    
 
The Pact, adopted by the European Council in Amsterdam in 
June 1997, comprised a Resolution of the European Council on 
the Stability and Growth Pact (16/17 June 1997), Council 
Regulation (No. 1466/97 of 7 July 1997) on the strengthening of 
the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies, and Council Regulation (No. 
1467/97 of 7 July 1997) on speeding up and  clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.   The 
Regulations entered into force on 1 July 1998 and 1 January 
1999, respectively. 
 
                                                 
3   For more detail on the Waigel proposal and the reasons why a number of its provisions 
were not retained see Buti et al, op. cit., pp, 83-4.   9
The recitals to the Regulations convey the intention of the Pact.   
Sound government finances are “a means of strengthening the 
conditions for price stability and for strong sustainable growth 
conducive to employment creation.”   As a means to achieving 
this goal, member states are expected to adhere to the medium-
term objective of budgetary positions close to balance or in 
surplus. 
 
Council Regulation No. 1466/97 requires member states to 
present stability programmes (for member states which have 
adopted the single currency) and convergence programmes (for 
member states which have not adopted the single currency) on a 
periodic basis that, inter alia, present the medium-term objective 
for the budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus and 
the adjustment path towards this objective for the general 
government balance.   Based on assessments by the 
Commission and the Economic and Financial Committee, the 
Council shall examine whether the measures being taken and or 
proposed are sufficient to achieve the targeted adjustment path 
towards the medium-term budgetary objective. 
 
The Council is required to deliver an opinion on each 
programme.   If it considers that the objectives and contents of 
a programme should be strengthened, the Council will ask the 
member state concerned to adjust its programme in this respect.   
The Council is also required to monitor the implementation of 
both stability programmes and convergence programmes with a 
view to identifying actual or significant divergence of the   10
budgetary position from the medium-term budgetary objective, 
or the adjustment path towards it, as set out in the programme.   
If it identifies such occurrences, the Council is required to issue 
a recommendation to the member state concerned to take the 
necessary adjustment measures.   If these divergences from the 
medium-term budgetary objective persist or worsen, the Council 
makes a recommendation to the member state to take prompt 
corrective measures and may make its recommendation public. 
   
The second Regulation, No. 1467/97, clarifies the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure.   The excess 
of a government deficit over the 3 per cent reference value 
resulting from a severe economic downturn shall be considered 
to be exceptional only if there is an annual fall of real GDP of at 
least 2 per cent.   However, the Council is obliged to take into 
account any observations made by the member state concerned 
that show that an annual fall of real GDP of less than 2 per cent 
is nevertheless exceptional in the light of further supporting 
evidence, in particular “on the abruptness of the downturn or on 
the accumulated loss of output relative to past trends”.    
 
The Regulation also clarifies the speed at which the excessive 
deficit procedure is implemented.   It, for example, establishes a 
deadline of four months at the most for effective action to be 
taken by a member state against whom an excessive defict 
finding has been made.   Finally, the Regulation outlines the 
sanctions applicable to a finding of an excessive deficit.   A 
non-interest-bearing deposit is to be taken where non-  11
compliance with the deficit criterion arises.   The deposit 
comprises a fixed component equal to 0.2 per cent of GDP, 
and a variable component equal to one-tenth of the difference 
between the deficit as a percentage of GDP in the preceding 
year and the reference value of 3 per cent of GDP.   Any single 
deposit taken, however, would not exceed 0.5 per cent of GDP.   
A deposit is to be converted into a fine after two years if the 
excessive deficit persists.   
 
(v)  Fiscal Policy in EMU:  The Importance of the Close to  
       Balance Provision 
 
Article 104c of the Treaty and the subsequent Stability and 
Growth Pact constitute important steps in helping to define rules 
for governing fiscal behaviour within EMU.   While the Pact has 
clarified many of the important aspects of the excessive deficit 
procedure, there are still a number of issues and anamolies that 
remain with regard to the fiscal rules agreed for EMU.    
 
One commonly-noted issue remaining unclarified by the Pact is 
whether an excessive deficit would be declared in circumstances 
where the debt level rose from or to a level above the 60 per 
cent reference level even though the deficit remained below the 3 
per cent benchmark (see Balassone and Monacelli, 2000
4).   
While a situation of a rising debt level accompanying a deficit 
below 3 per cent is conceivable, there is a more universal and 
immediate difficulty for member states and monitoring 
                                                 
4    Balassone F., and D. Monacelli (2000), “EMU Fiscal Rules: Is there a Gap?”, Temi di 
Discussione, Banca d’Italia, forthcoming. 
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organisations having to interpret the close to balance provision 
in preparing and assessing stability and convergence 
programmes.   Unlike the Waigel proposal where a medium-
term goal of 1 per cent is specified, there is no numerical value 
mentioned in the Pact in respect of the medium-term fiscal 
balance target, rather the medium-term target is required to be 
“close to balance or in surplus”.   There i s also no specific 
definition of “medium-term”.     
 
It is imperative that the close to balance provision is tied down, 
as many other provisions of the Pact (particularly those relating 
to the surveillance of budgetary positions) hinge on some notion 
of what the close to balance provision means in practice.   
Before examining the two Regulations and the Council 
Resolution that comprise the Pact and subsequent official 
documents as to what they say in respect of the close to 
balance provision, the chronology of proposals and discussion 
leading to the formulation and adoption of the Pact provides 
some initial, important guidance to interpreting the close to 
balance provision.   In particular, the replacement of the 1 per 
cent of GDP medium-term goal espoused in the Waigel 
proposal with a medium-term goal of close to balance or in 
surplus in the final Pact text reflected a view that a uniform 
numerical medium-term goal for all member states is not 
appropriate.   On the one hand, a 1 per cent deficit target might 
not guarantee the maintenance of a deficit below 3 per cent in 
normal economic conditions for some member states.   On the 
other hand, a 1 per cent deficit target might prove unnecessarily   13
demanding of other member states for ensuring no breach of the 
Treaty deficit requirement and, therefore, would restrict those 
member states’ scope for fiscal flexibility beyond that necessary 
for compliance with Article 104c. 
 
A common numerical medium-term budgetary target across 
member states is, therefore, neither intended nor required by the 
Pact.   However, a common basis for arriving at close-to-
balance targets for individual member states is warranted to 
ensure a consistent series of targets across member states.   In 
the remainder of this paper, a possible common interpretation is 
outlined and developed.       
 
 
3.   A Review of Official Documents 
(i) The Two Council Regulations and the Council   
     Resolution 
 
A natural starting point for attempting to interpret the close to 
balance provision is to examine what the two Regulations and 
the Resolution that comprise the Pact have to say with regard to 
the provision.    
 
Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and 
Growth Pact (16/17 June 1997) 
 
The Resolution predates the regulations.   It emphasises that 
there is a clear Treaty obligation on member states to avoid 
excessive deficits and stresses also “the importance of 
safeguarding sound government finances as a means to   14
strengthening the conditions for price stability and for strong 
sustainable growth c onducive to employment creation.”   It 
continues that “adherence to the objective of sound budgetary 
positions close to balance or in surplus will allow all Member 
States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the 
government deficit within the 3 percent of GDP reference 
value.” 
 
Council Regulations (EC) No 1466/97 and No 1467/97 (7 
July 1997) 
 
Of the two Regulations, the first, EC no. 1466/97 on the 
strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the 
surveillance and coordination of economic policies, addresses 
the close to balance provision.   Section 2, Article 3 and Section 
3, Article 7 specify that stability and convergence programmes 
shall present  
 
“the medium-term objective for the budgetary position of close 
to balance or in surplus and the adjustment path towards this 
objective for the general government surplus/deficit and the 
expected path of the general government debt ratio”. 
 
Section 2, Article 5 and Section 3, Article 9 add: 
 
“Based on assessments by the Commission and the Committee 
..., the Council shall, ..., examine whether the medium-term 
budget objective in the stability/convergence  programme 
provides for a safety margin to ensure the avoidance of an 
excessive deficit, ... and whether the measures being taken 
and/or proposed are sufficient to achieve the targeted 
adjustment path towards the medium-term budgetary objective.” 
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The recital to the Regulation also contains reference to the close 
to balance issue.   Item 4 reiterates the Resolution in stating that: 
“whereas adherence to the medium-term objective of budgetary 
positions close to balance or in surplus will allow Member 
States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while keeping the 
government deficit within the 3 per cent of GDP reference 
value”. 
 
Item 14 states that  
“whereas the Council, when examining and monitoring the 
stability programmes and the convergence programmes and in 
particular their medium-term budgetary objective or the targeted 
adjustment path towards this objective, should take into account 
the relevant cyclical and structural characteristics of the 
economy of each Member State”. 
 
(ii) 12 October 1998 Opinion of the Monetary Committee  
      (MC/II/482-98-final) 
 
In October 1998, an Opinion of the Monetary Committee was 
published that provided an agreed code of conduct on the 
content and format of stability and convergence programmes.   
In this respect, this Opinion is particularly useful in seeking to 
understand the medium-term objective of close to balance or in 
surplus that is to be outlined in those programmes. 
 
According to the Opinion, the Resolution’s requiring that the 
cyclical position and its effect on the budget be accounted for 
in the assessment of medium-term budgetary objectives implies 
that the time frame for interpreting the medium-term is the length 
of the business cycle.   It is also stressed that it is important that 
the medium-term budgetary position of close to balance or in 
surplus does not become “a moving target”.   In practical terms,   16
the medium-term objective should be achieved as quickly as 
possible and by no later than by the end of 2002. 
 
In assessing how actual and expected budgetary developments 
compare with the medium-term budgetary objective, it is 
suggested that “an approximate approach” must be adopted in 
practice.   Assessing the cyclical component would serve as a 
useful starting point in this respect.   The need to take into 
account other relevant factors in assessing budgetary 
developments is also recognised.   Specific consideration 
should be given to other (non-cyclical) sources of variability 
and uncertainty in budgets, to the need to reduce high debt 
ratios, and to the need to prepare for the greater burden on 
government budgets in the future arising from population 
ageing.   It is also noted that member states that might wish to 
make use of discretionary policy would need to create the 
additional room in medium-term targets necessary for such 
manoeuvre.   
 
 
4.    Interpreting the Close to Balance Provision    
In seeking to understand and interpret s ensibly the close to 
balance provision, it is perhaps best to assess separately the key 
terms “budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus” and 
“medium term”.    
 
(i)   What is Meant by “Medium-Term”?   17
What is meant by the phrase “medium-term” in the Pact’s text 
concerning the close to balance or in surplus provision?    There 
is little by way of explanation or definition in the Pact.   
Regulation 1466/97 requires that stability and convergence 
programmes should present “the medium-term objective for the 
budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus and the 
adjustment path towards this objective”.   Perhaps, the most 
obvious reading of a medium-term objective of achieving a 
budget balance close to balance or in surplus is that that target 
should be achieved on average over the economic cycle.   Such 
an interpretation could also have a practical benefit insofar as if 
it is assumed, for simplicity, that the economic cycle is 
symmetrical in its impact on the budget balance then the 
medium-term target would involve keeping the underlying 
structural budget balance close to balance or in surplus.   In any 
one year, an estimate of the underlying structural budget balance 
could be compared with the close to balance or in surplus target 
in order to assess a member state’s compliance with the Pact. 
 
A medium-term target of a budgetary position close to balance 
or in surplus, therefore, seems to require that that target is 
achieved on average over the economic cycle.   It should be 
noted that this does not require that the actual budget balance in 
each year be close to balance or in surplus.   Fiscal policy 
remains a national responsibility within EMU and can be used as 
a means of stabilising aggregate demand growth at national level.   
To stabilise aggregate demand growth, the actual budget 
balance must be free to move in response to economic   18
fluctuations on a year-to-year basis.   A fall in the underlying 
budget balance below the close to balance benchmark, 
however, increases the risk of an excessive deficit  arising in 
normal economic circumstances.   It is important, therefore, that 
movements in the actual budget balance are analysed according 




(ii)  What is Meant or Intended by “Close to Balance or in 
Surplus”, and What Factors Enter into its Calculation? 
 
The Need to Deduct from the 3 per cent. Excessive Deficit 
Benchmark 
 
The phrase “close to balance or in surplus” in itself does not 
specify any particular budget balance value.   The only 
numerical value explicit in the Pact in specifying the “close to 
balance or in surplus” provision is the 3 per cent. Treaty 
excessive deficit benchmark.   A budget balance of close to 
balance or in surplus will, according to the Resolution, allow 
“Member States to deal with normal cyclical fluctuations while 
keeping the government deficit within 3 per cent.”   Thus, it 
seems reasonable to argue that the close to balance or in surplus 
calculation will involve some deduction from the 3 per cent. 
mark.   This interpretation seems to be consistent also with 
another statement in the Regulation: “the Council shall... 
examine whether the medium-term budget objective in the 
stability programme provides for a safety margin to ensure the   19
avoidance of an excessive deficit [i.e. a deficit in excess of the 3 
per cent deficit limit].”    
 
Why Cyclical and Random Factors should enter the Close to 
Balance Arithmetic 
 
What adjustment should be made to the 3 per cent. deficit figure 
to arrive at the “close to balance or in surplus” level?   Both the 
Resolution and the recital to the Regulation say that “normal 
cyclical fluctuations” must be entered into the arithmetic.   The 
Regulation itself requires the provision “of a safety margin to 
ensure the avoidance of an excessive deficit”.    
 
A “safety margin” has a broader connotation than “normal 
cyclical fluctuations”.   It suggests making allowance in a 
quantifiable manner for all uncertainties that can impinge on the 
deficit.   The time frame for this assessment is the medium term.   
In the medium term (i.e., over the economic cycle), uncertainties 
impacting on the budget balance include both cyclical variation 
in economic activity and random, non-cyclical factors.   The 
extent of business cycle variation in any future year is ex-ante 
unknown.   Random influences are, by definition, not 
predictable.   Thus, it seems that a  minimum safety margin 
should at least account for both cyclical and random influences 
on the budget balance. 
 
Should Allowance be Made for Discretionary Policy? 
The October 1998 Opinion specifies that if member states wish 
to make use of discretionary fiscal policy then they should build   20
an additional margin into their medium-targets for this purpose.   
This requires an additional margin for discretionary policy being 
built into medium-term targets only if member states intend to 
pursue an active fiscal policy over the medium-term.  
 
It is possible that a suggestion could be made that irrespective 
of their intentions with regard to using discretionary policy that 
member states be required in all cases to make an allowance for 
possible discretionary policy action, perhaps based on an 
analysis of past fiscal policy behaviour.   There are, however, 
good arguments against requiring a specific allowance for 
discretionary policy in medium-term targets.    
 
Most importantly, requiring that member states make additional 
allowance for discretionary policy appears to go beyond what is 
intended by the Pact which strictly requires only an allowance 
for the impact on the budget balance of normal economic 
fluctuations which are outside the control of government.   In 
contrast, discretionary fiscal policy is, by definition, at the 
control of government and, therefore, does not have to enter 
into the safety margin arithmetic. 
 
There may also be an issue relating to the principle of 
subsidarity in requiring an additional margin for discretionary 
fiscal policy.   Member states not intending to pursue an active 
fiscal policy would be meeting the fiscal discipline required in 
setting a medium-term budget target that provided for a safety 
margin in respect of normal economic fluctuations.   In this   21
regard, requiring an additional margin in respect of discretionary 
policy could be construed as impinging on member states’ 
fiscal flexibility. 
 
Advocates of an additional margin for discretionary policy 
might suggest, for instance, that the influence of past 
discretionary policy on the budget balance should be measured 
and added into the minimum safety margin that already accounts 
for the influence of both cyclical and random influences on the 
budget balance.   Besides posing empirical measurement 
difficulties, there would also be a practical signalling issue 
involved in choosing to incorporate past discretionary fiscal 
behaviour into safety margin calculations.   A retrospective 
analysis of discretionary fiscal policy might indicate for any 
number of member states that fiscal policy has been pro-
cyclical in nature (Lane (1998)
 5, for example, finds evidence of 
pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour in Ireland in the 1980s and 1990s 
and public choice literature would suggest that pro-cyclical 
fiscal behaviour might be expected to be the norm).   If this was 
the case then discretionary fiscal policy would be systematically 
countering the influence of the economic cycle on the budget 
balance.   This would mean that incorporating past discretionary 
fiscal behaviour into margin calculations would lead to lower 
safety margins being required of member states than would be 
the case where cyclical and random factors alone were 
accounted for.   In turn, this would mean that lower safety 
                                                 
5   Lane P. (1998), “On the Cyclicality of Irish Fiscal Policy”, The Economic and Social 
Review, 29,1, pp.1-16. 
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margins would be espoused than would be warranted by 
cyclical and random factors alone.            
 
It seems, therefore, that the inclusion of an allowance for 
discretionary fiscal policy is not required in setting medium-term 
safety margins.   Using past discretionary policy action as a 
basis for providing a margin may present empirical measurement 
and signalling difficulties. 
 
Allowance for Other Factors? 
The Opinion of the Monetary Committee suggests that longer-
term, structural influences should be accounted for in the setting 
of budget targets consistent with the Pact.   It suggests the need 
for a steady and rapid decline in debt ratios in high-debt 
countries and the need to prepare for a greater burden on the 
public finances as the population dependency-ratio increases 
should be addressed in the setting of budget targets.    
 
Identifying these two factors as relevant to the issue of the 
setting of budget targets is consistent with the c lause in the 
recital to the Regulation stating that “relevant cyclical and 
structural characteristics” should be considered by the Council 
“in examining adherence to the medium-term budgetary 
objective”.   However, it must be asked whether  considering 
structural characteristics implies that they must be actually 
pencilled into the close to balance or in surplus arithmetic.  
   23
In the medium term, the influence of structural developments, 
such as the outlay on pensions arising from demographic 
changes, on the budget balance in any year will be known and 
can be effectively taken as given.   There is no reason to expect 
any significant exogenous shock to that pension expenditure 
projection in the medium term time frame.   Consequently, if 
one considers safety margin as being synonymous with risk, 
pension expenditures would not seem to enter the calculation of 
the minimum safety margin that embraces both cyclical and 
random influences on the budget balance.    
 
While future pension outlays are predictable in their impact on 
the deficit, the situation with regard to the debt is, to some 
extent, different.   On one hand, the debt level is directly 
comparable to the pensions issue in its implications for the 
minimum safety margin insofar as its size per se does not pose 
any implications for the deficit and, thus, no additional margin in 
respect of the level of debt needs to be made in setting the 
minimum safety margin.    
 
The costs of servicing that debt, which impacts on the budget 
balance, does, however, have implications for the calculation of 
the minimum safety margin.   On one level, given that the 
economic cycle will affect the size of the primary balance, there 
will likely be a pass-through effect from the deficit to the level of 
the debt.   In turn, this will affect the debt-servicing costs in the 
deficit arithmetic.
    
   24
While the impact on debt-servicing costs of changes in the 
primary balance should be accounted for in the safety margin 
calculation, they could be expected to be comparatively small 
relative to the impact that changes in interest rates can have on 
debt-servicing costs and, thus, the overall deficit.   This raises 
the question as to whether cyclical and random movements in 
interest rates should also be accounted for in the calculation of 
the minimum safety margin to be deducted from the 3 per cent. 
excessive deficit benchmark.    
 
The case for accounting for fluctuations in interest rates is 
strong.   The text of the Pact stresses the need for member 
states’ budgetary positions “to deal with normal  cyclical 
fluctuations while keeping the government deficit within the 3 
per cent. of GDP reference value.”   Fluctuations in interest 
rates, along with fluctuations in real economic activity, are 
normal economic events and impact directly on the budget 
deficit.   The impact of interest rate fluctuations on the budget 
balance should, therefore, be included, alongside those of 




The Need for a Long Run Safety Margin 
It has been argued above that structural influences on the budget 
balance, such as demographic factors, should not enter the 
                                                 
6   The question arises as to whether, in practice, part of this variation would be captured 
in the aforementioned safety margin calculations for cyclical and random real economic 
factors.   This highlights the more general concern of the need to avoid double-counting 
when calculating the safety margin. 
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calculation of the minimum safety margin (that dealing with the 
impact that normal economic fluctuations can have on the 
budget deficit).   In the case of demographic factors, for 
example, their development and influence on the budget balance 
can be taken as given.   There are no grounds for expecting any 
exogenous shock to impact significantly on the outlay 
government has budgeted for in respect of pensions in the 
medium term.   Thus, demographic factors do not need to be 
accounted for in the calculation of the minimum safety margin.    
 
This, however, is not to deny that factors such as the prospect 
of a greater outlay on pensions in the long run or the desirability 
of reducing debt levels towards sustainable levels should not be 
addressed or highlighted in assessments of member states’ 
current and medium-term budget plans.   It must be recognised 
that if one assumes no change with respect to government 
policy on pension funding ageing populations will result in 
increased outlays on pensions in the future, which (ceteris 
paribus) will cause the budget deficit to rise over time and with 
it the risk of an excessive deficit being incurred in the long run 
will also increase.   It may be advisable on such grounds to 
provide some allowance in current medium-term budget targets 
to help offset the negative impact that demographic 
developments will have on the budget balance in the long run.   
One m eans of doing so is to have lower medium-term deficit 
targets.   This would lower long run debt levels and thereof 
reduce debt-servicing outlays in the long run.   This would act 
to offset the impact that higher ageing-related expenditures will   26
have over time on the budget balance.
7   Ensuring that the safety 
margin built into medium-term budget targets is sufficient to 
offset the increased costs of the ageing of the population should 
be given important consideration.    
 
Notwithstanding that reducing the d ebt can help pay for 
increases in ageing-related expenditure, the possibility of an 
excessive deficit being declared so long as the ratio of 
government debt to gross domestic product exceeds the 60 per 
cent. Treaty reference value highlights the need for debt levels to 
be brought down.   Member states whose debt levels exceed the 
60 per cent. benchmark should endeavour to set deficit targets 
that ensure a sufficiently rapid movement to below the 60 per 
cent. level. 
 
Thus, alongside the minimum safety margin discussed above, an 
additional margin for long term factors could be calculated that 
might be incorporated into stability and convergence 
programme budget targets.   This margin for long-term factors 
would indicate the budget balance targets that would ensure that 
an excessive deficit does not arise in the long run. 
 
5.    Conclusions 
This paper has sought to identify how the close to balance 
provision of the Stability and Growth Pact should be interpreted 
and to ascertain what it requires of member states in setting their 
                                                 
7    D. Franco and T. Munzi (1997), “Ageing and Fiscal Policies in the European Union”, 
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budgetary targets.   Among the conclusions reached were that a 
budgetary position of close to balance or in surplus can be 
objectively calculated by deducting a safety margin from the 
Treaty deficit limit of 3 per cent. of GDP.   It was argued that 
the safety margin should at least take account of those factors 
whose impact on the budget balance in the medium term can not 
be forecast with certainty.   In this respect, both cyclical and 
random factors must be included in the safety margin.   This 
safety margin can be thought of as a minimum safety margin – it 
indicates the safety margin required to avoid an excessive deficit 
in the medium term.   It was also argued that an additional, 
supplementary margin for long-term factors should be 
considered.       